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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. 
MARY ANN ROBERTS (SADLER) j 
Defendant/Appellee. ] 
i Case No. 920242-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE MARY ANN ROBERTS (SADLER) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropriate in this Court pursuant 
to §78-2a-3(2)(i), U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the Trial Court Correctly Apply the 
Provisions of §78-45-7.2(4)(5), U.C.A. (1953, as Amended) in 
its Modification of the Child Support? 
1 
The applicable standard of appellate review requires 
the Appellate Court to accord substantial deference to the 
trial court's action and gives the trial court considerable 
latitude in determining appropriate relief; the Appellate 
Court will not disturb the trial court's actions unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or there has 
been an abuse of discretion. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 
393 (Utah 1985); Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 
1990); Stettler v. Stettler, 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985). 
2. Does the Fact that the Record Submitted for 
Appellate Review Failed to Include the Findings of Fact Made 
and Entered by the Trial Court Constitute Reversible Error? 
The applicable standard for review requires the trial 
court to iricike and enter findings of fact which should be 
provided in the record to the appellate court for review. 
However, when the Findings of Fact are made and entered by 
the trial court, but then are not included in the trial 
court's record for appellate review the Standard of Review 
does not require this omission to be held as reversible error 
and the appellate court should look to the remaining record 
to complete its review. §30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953, as amended); 
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. 
2 
3. Was There a Material Change of Circumstances 
Sufficient to Modify the Decree of Divorce? 
The Standard of Review applicable to this case where 
the Appellate failed to provide a transcript of the 
proceedings at which the trial court heard the evidence and 
ruled upon the issue on appeal, the Appellate Court must 
presume that the trial court's action and resulting order 
were supported by the evidence and that a material change of 
circumstance was demonstrated. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1985) 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes 
§78-45-7.2(2)(a)(b) U.C.A. (1953, as amended) (4-23-90) 
(2)(a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as 
a rebuttable presumption in establishing or 
modifying the amount of temporary or permanent 
child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption mecins the provisions 
and considerations required by the guidelines 
and the award amounts resulting from the 
application of the guidelines are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provision of 
this section. 
3 
§78-45-7.2(4) (5) U.C.A. (1953, as amended) (4-23-90) 
(4)(a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent 
who live in the home of that parent and are not 
children in common to both parties may at the 
option of either party be taken into account 
under the guidelines in setting or modifying a 
child support award, as provided in Subsection 
(5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that 
compute the obligations of the respective 
parents for the additional children. The 
obligations shall then be subtracted from the 
appropriate parent's income before determining 
the award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
consideration of natural or adoptive children other 
than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be 
applied to justify a decrease in the award. 
Rules 
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the 
court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; 
in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of 
4 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The 
trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in ruling on motions, except 
as provided in Rule 412(b). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the 
ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding 
challenged finding or conclusion. If the 
appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is 
contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The case on appeal is based upon an Order Modifying 
Decree of Divorce which was entered on March 10, 1992, in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. A Petition for Modification filed on September 28, 
1990, requested a change of custody on the part of Mr. 
Roberts, the Plaintiff. Mrs. Roberts, the Defendant, 
counterclaimed requesting an increase in child support 
payments pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
The issue concerning change of custody of the parties two (2) 
minor children was settled upon receipt of the child custody 
evaluation recommending that the two (2) minor children 
5 
remain with Mrs, Roberts* A trial was held on the issue of 
the Counterclaim requesting a modification of child support 
and extended visitation rights. Trial was held in two (2) 
settings; the first, on January 9, 1992, and the second, on 
January 21, 1992* The trial court ruled in favor of Mrs. 
Roberts to increase the child support payments and to clarify 
the summer visitation schedule. Mr. Roberts appealed the 
decision of the trial court in regard to the child support 
increase on the grounds that the trial court failed to 
correctly apply the Uniform Child Support Guidelines by its 
failure to take into consideration Mr. Roberts1 new child 
from his subsequent marriage. Mr. Roberts asserts that the 
trial court did not have the option to not consider the new 
child, but was obligated to deduct the expenses of the "child 
not in common to both parties" in the application of the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The other issues raised by 
Mr. Roberts on appeal such as the existence of a material 
change of circumstances and the entering of findings of facts 
by the trial court are ancillary to that central issue on 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OP FACTS 
1. Mr. Roberts, the Plaintiff/Appellant, and Mrs. 
Roberts, the Defendant/Appellee were divorced on March 5, 
1984, (R.17). Child support was set for the two (2) minor 
children in the sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS 
($175.00) per month, per child, for a total child support 
obligation in the sum of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS 
($350.00). 
2. Subsequent to the divorce in 1984, Mr. Roberts 
remarried and shortly before he brought his Petition for 
Modification for Change of Custody on September 28, 1990, Mr. 
Roberts and his new wife had a child born as issue of their 
marriage. 
3. Mr. Roberts1 petition for modification of divorce 
decree requested that there be a change of custody of the two 
(2) minor children of his marriage with Mrs. Roberts. Mrs. 
Roberts counterclaimed requesting an increase in child 
support consistent with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines 
and asserting that in the interim period from the original 
divorce on March 5, 1984, that there had been a material 
change of circumstances in that the expenses of raising the 
two (2) teenage boys had substantially increased on her 
part, that the child support obligation of Mr. Roberts 
7 
had not changed since 1984 and that Mr, Roberts had 
experienced a substantial increases in his income* (R.90) 
4. The trial court subsequently appointed a child 
custody evaluator to prepare an evaluation. The evaluation 
submitted to the trial court recommended that the minor 
children remain with Mrs. Roberts as the custodial parent 
consistent with the original Divorce Decree of March 5, 1984. 
5. After a number of proceedings before the court on 
discovery and scheduling, the matter came on for trial on 
January 9, 1992, (R. 139) to resolve the remaining issues 
between the parties, the primary issue being increased child 
support. Central to that issue was that of the question of 
whether or not Mr. Roberts1 new child with his second 
marriage was required to be factored into the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines by the trial court in determining the 
child support. This issue was heard on January 9, 1992, and 
the court determined that it was not required to consider the 
"child not in common to both parties" and that the child 
support would be increased from ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE 
DOLLARS ($175.00) per child, to TWO HUNDRED TWELVE DOLLARS 
($212.00) per child. (T.160, 163). 
6. The trial court continued the trial to January 
21, 1992, at which time it heard the remainder of the 
proffered evidence by the respective counsel and made 
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additional findings on visitation and again stated that the 
child support would be increased from ($175.00) to ($212.00) 
per month per child. The trial court based its calculations 
upon application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
(T.172) The trial court made other additional findings in 
regard to issues which have not been appealed. 
7. Mr. Roberts appealed the Order of Modification of 
March 10, 1992, asserting that the trial court had no option, 
but was required to take into consideration under the Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines, the fact that Mr. Roberts had a new 
child from a new marriage in determining the child support. 
Secondarily, Mr. Roberts raised on appeal the fact that the 
trial court had not made nor entered any Findings of Fact nor 
was there a material change of circumstance* to justify the 
increased child support. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Applied the Provisions 
of §78-45-7.2, U.C.A. (1953, as Amended). The position of 
Mrs. Roberts, the Appellee, is that the trial court correctly 
applied the provision of §78-45-7.2,(4)(5), which provide an 
option to the trial court in considering the impact of a 
"child not in common to both parties" in the calculation 
of increased child support under the Uniform Child 
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Support Guidelines. The position of Mr. Roberts, the 
Appellant, is that the trial court has no option and is 
required to consider his new child with his second marriage 
after he optioned to take into account his new child for 
consideration under the child support guidelines. It is the 
position of Mrs. Roberts that Mr. Roberts misreads §78-45-
7.2(5), which in fact gives the trial court the option to 
consider or not the new child and mitigate the increased 
child support award. The trial court chose not to consider 
the "child not in common to both parties" in mitigating the 
child support award. 
Application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines 
are presumed to be correct unless Mr, Roberts can rebut the 
presumption as is found in §78-45-7.2(2)(a)(b)• The record 
does not reflect any rebutted presumptions nor any evidence 
submitted by Mr. Roberts for which the trial court should 
have rebutted the presumptions. There is no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's decision not to mitigate the 
child support increase by not considering the "child not in 
common to both parties". Mr. Roberts failure to supply 
rebuttable evidence is supported by the fact that Mr. Roberts 
failed to provide a transcript for the hearing of January 9, 
10 
1992, where the child support award was heard and determined 
by the trial court. Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure require that a transcript be provided to the 
Appellate Court on all evidence which would challenge the 
conclusions of the trial court. Although required, no such 
transcript was provided. 
II. That the Record on Appeal Fails to Include the 
Trial Court Findings of Fact is Not Reversible Error. Mrs. 
Roberts acknowledges that findings of facts are required 
under §30-3-5, U.C.A., (1953, as amended), and Rule 52(a)(c), 
U.R.C.P. A review of the record supplied for appeal fails to 
include any designated findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. However, Findings of Fact were made by the trial court 
on January 9, 1992, and supplemented on January 21, 1992, as 
is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings, objections 
to the findings by Mr. Roberts' attorney, and by the Order of 
Modification entered by the trial court. Furthermore, the 
Order of Modification of March 10, 1992, is extensive in its 
scope and breadth as to information, salary, and percentages 
in the calculation of the increase of child support and the 
application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines by the 
trial court. While not formally noted or designated as 
findings of fact, Mrs. Roberts urges the Court that the Order 
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of Modification of Decree of Divorce meets the threshold 
requirements of findings of fact in view of the omission, not 
explained by the Record, that the Record does not contain the 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law submitted to 
opposing counsel and to the trial court for entering which 
the trial court acknowledges entering. 
111. The Trial Court Found a Material Change of 
Circumstances Sufficient to Modify the Divorce Decree. The 
transcript of the proceedings the trial of January 21, 1992, 
and the Order of Modification of March 5, 1992, reflect that 
the Court was aware of the material change of circumstances 
between the parties. There was an eight (8) year span of 
time from the original Divorce Decree of March 5, 1984, until 
the Order of Modification of March 10, 1992. A significant 
disparity existed between the income of Mr. Roberts and Mrs. 
Roberts, and that the application of the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines showed a twenty one percent (21%) increase 
in child support from 1992 to the original child support 
payments rciquired in 1984. These factors cited above 
constitute a material change of circumstances. Taken 
together with the fact that the trial court's order is 
presumed to be correct in view of the fact that Mr. Roberts 
failed to provide a transcript of the trial on January 9, 
12 
1992, all establish the presumption that there was a material 
change of circumstances and that the trial court's Order is 
correct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF §78-
45-7.2 U.C.A. (1953, AS AMENDED). 
A. Consideration by the Trial Court of "Children Not 
in Common to the Parties11 is Optional in Determining Child 
Support Amounts. Mr. Roberts subsequent to the divorce from 
Mrs. Roberts on March 5, 1984, remarried and shortly before 
Mr. Roberts brought his Petition for Modification before the 
Trial Court on September 28, 1990, he and his new wife gave 
birth to a child. Mr. Roberts urges this Court that the 
trial court failed to correctly apply §78-45-7.2(4)(a),(5), 
which reads as follows: 
(4)(a) "Natural or adoptive children of either 
parent who live in the home of that parent 
and are not children in common to both 
parties may at the option of either party 
be taken into account under the guidelines 
in setting or modifying a child support 
award, as provided in Subsection (5). 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing 
award, consideration of natural or adoptive 
children other than those in common to both 
parties may be applied to mitigate an 
13 
increase in the award, but may not be 
applied to justify an decrease in the 
award." (Emphasis added). 
While the trial court can consider "children not in 
common to both parties" in a hearing to increase child 
support payments, the trial court is not obligated to do so. 
Consideration of "children not in common to both parties" is 
optional with the trial court* The trial court chose not to 
take into consideration "children not in common to both 
parties", but applied the Uniform Child Support Guidelines as 
stated in its Order Modifying Decree of Divorce dated March 
10, 1992, (Addendum "D", Page 5, Paragraph 4). 
B. Application by the Court of the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines are Presumed to be Correct. §78-45-
7.2(2)(a)(b) sets forth this premise: 
(2) (a) "The child support guidelines shall be 
applied as a rebuttable presumption in 
establishing or modifying the amount of 
temporary or permanent child support." 
(b) The rebuttal presumption means the 
provisions and consideration required by 
the guidelines and the award amounts 
resulting from the application of the 
guidelines are presumed to be correct, 
unless rebutted under the provisions of 
this section." 
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Mr. Roberts failed to present any evidence that would rebut 
the presumption of the application of the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines. The record fails to reflect any evidence 
submitted by Mr. Roberts to rebut the presumption applying 
the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Therefore, the trial 
court's application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines 
should be upheld. In failing to rebut the presumption for 
the application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, Mr. 
Roberts did not establish any special circumstances to rebut 
the presumption that would justify deviation from the Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines. This Court has set out the 
criteria for deviation from the application of the Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines as rebuttable presumptions in the 
case of Hill v. Hill, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 filed on November 
4, 1992. The Court state on Page 27, the following: 
"§78-45-7.2(2)(a) requires the trial court to 
apply the child support guidelines as a 
rebuttable presumption in estciblishing or 
modifying the amount of temporary or permanent 
child support. In order to rebut this statutory 
presumption, the trial court must make a finding 
that use of the guidelines would be unjust, 
inappropriate or not in the best interest of the 
child, Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.2 (3) (1992). 
In this case, the trial court made no such 
finding." 
It is clear that the trial court did not make the finding 
that the Guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in 
the best interest of the minor children in the instant case. 
15 
(T.172), (Addendum "D", Page 5, Paragraph 4, Order Modifying 
Decree of Divorce). 
C. Mr. Roberts Failed to Provide a Transcript of the 
Hearing of January 9, 1992, Where the Child Support was Set. 
The trial in the matter now before this Court on appeal was 
held on two (2) separate settings. The trial was originally 
set and heard on January 29, 1992, with a second hearing date 
held on January 21, 1992, (Please see Addendum "B", Minute 
Entry, 01-09-92)* At the trial on January 9, 1992, the trial 
court established the child support amounts at TWO HUNDRED 
TWELVE DOLLARS ($212.00) per month for a total of FOUR 
HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR DOLLARS ($424,00), (T.160, 162). 
However, Mr« Roberts as the Plaintiff/Appellant in this 
matter has provided this Court with a transcript only of the 
proceedings of January 21, 1992, and not a transcript of the 
proceedings of January 9, 1992, where the issue of child 
support was heard and determined by the trial court. 
1. Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
requires that an Appellant who wishes to challenge a proposed 
ruling of the trial court must prepare a transcript of that 
portion of the evidence relevant to the finding or conclusion 
that the Appellant wishes to appeal * Rule 11(e)(2), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure states as follows: 
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Transcript required of all evidence regarding 
challenged finding or conclusion. If the Appellant 
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the 
evidence, the Appellant shall include in the record a 
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding 
or conclusion. 
Rule 11(e)(2) and its requirement for a transcript to be 
supplied by the Appellant is supported by the Supreme Court 
in the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 
1985), on Page 394, where the Court states as follows: 
"The Plaintiff has not provided this Court with a 
transcript of any evidence produced at the hearing 
below on his Petition for Modification. In the 
absence of a transcript of the evidence below and 
proper citations to the record which support a 
substantial change of circumstance, we presume the 
trial court's finding and order are supported by the 
evidence. )Proudfit v. Proudfit. Utah, 598 P.2d 1318 
(1979)." 
Rule 11(e)(2) and Woodward v. Woodward, supra, support the 
concept that the trial court is presumed to have correctly 
applied the Uniform Child Support Guidelines in the instant 
case. (T.172). 
D. Cases Cited by Mr. Roberts are Inappropriate. 
Cases cited by Mr. Roberts requiring the trial court to 
consider post-decree obligations are dated and no longer in 
point. §78-45-7.2 (4) (5) was rewritten and amended by the 
Legislature with the effective date of April 23, 1990. Mr. 
17 
Robert's Petition for Modification of the Divorce Decree was 
filed with the trial court on September 28, 1990, (R.71). 
Mr. Roberts cites three (3) cases which indicate that the 
Court should take into consideration obligations of "children 
not in common to both parties". The Openshaw v. Openshaw, 
639 P.2d 1771 (Utah 1981); Lord v. Shaw 682, P.2d 853 (Utah 
1984); Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985). None 
of these cases are closely in point and do not deal with §78-
45-7.2(4)(5), as its amended on April 23, 1990. These cases 
all predate even the first version of this statute prior to 
its amendment by the Legislature on April 23, 1990. While 
helpful in other contexts and for other purposes, these cases 
should not be considered to be definitive in regard to the 
application of the above cited statute. There does not 
appear to be any Utah appellate cases that apply to §78-45-
7.2(4) (5) as amended (04-23-1990). 
POINT II. 
THAT THE RECORD ON APPEAL FAILS TO INCLUDE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACTS SUPPORTING ITS ORDER OF 
MODIFICATION IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
18 
A. Defendant and Appellee Acknowledge that §30-
3-5 U.C.A., (1953, as amended) and Rule 52(a)(c), U.R.C.P. 
Require that the Trial Court Enter Findings of Fact. Mrs. 
Roberts acknowledges that findings of fact are required in 
contested matters where a divorce decree is modified as in 
the instant case. Mrs. Roberts believes that the trial court 
complied with the requirement of §30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended) and Rule 52(a)(c) U.R.C.P. A review of the record 
of the trial court and the transcript of the last of the two 
(2) trial hearings clearly reflects that the trial court made 
Findings of Fact, requested counsel to prepare the same and 
then entered them. 
B. Findings of Fact Were Made by the Trial Court on 
January 9, 1992, and January 21, 1992. At the first of the 
two hearings at which the trial on this matter was held on 
January 9, 1992, the trial court made modifications of the 
child support. On January 9, 1992, the trial court heard the 
evidence and made findings of fact and rule>d that the child 
support in the instant case would be TWO HUNDRED TWELVE 
DOLLARS ($212.00) per month per child. (T.2,4) On January 
21f 1992, at the second hearing the trial court reiterated 
its conclusion of law on the child support issue and ruled on 
the additional issues that yet remained between the parties. 
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(T.14,15) However, as previously stated in Point I above, no 
transcript has been provided by the Appellant for review of 
those findings made on January 9, 1992. 
C. Findings of Fact were Prepared and Submitted by 
Counsel Designed by the Trial Court. The trial court on 
January 21, 1992, after having made Findings of Fact for that 
hearing and assigned counsel for Mrs. Roberts to prepare the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order 
Modifying the Decree of Divorce to be submitted to the Court 
on or before January 28, 1992, (T.15). Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and an Order Modifying Divorce Decree 
were submitted pursuant to the order of the trial court. 
While the record for appeal does not include those Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the record does reflect Mr. 
Roberts1 counsel receiving them, as he filed Objections to 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce, on January 30, 1992. (R.143) 
(Addendum "C") It should be noted that the Objections filed 
by Mr. Roberts1 counsel object not to the Findings of Fact as 
submitted but only to specific paragraphs in the Order of 
Modification. 
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D. Trial Court Acknowledges that it Entered its 
Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court 
complied with the provisions of §30-3-5 U.C.A. (1953, as 
amended) and Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., which require the entering 
of Findings of Fact. While the record supplied for review 
does not contain a copy of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law submitted to the court, the trial court 
acknowledges entering its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in the first paragraph of the Order Modifying Decree of 
Divorce entered by the Court on March 10, 1992. (R.146) 
(Addendum "D") 
While the record on appeal makes no explanation why 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted and 
entered by the Court are not included in the record for this 
Court to review, it is clear that the trial court made 
findings of fact and further requested that they be reduced 
to writing and be submitted to the trial court for entering. 
It is also clear that opposing counsel reviewed the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and filed objections to he 
same. And lastly, the trial court acknowledges entering the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prior to its entering 
the Order of Modification. There is no apparent explanation 
why the Findings of Facts entered by the trial court are not 
included with the trial record for review. However, this 
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failure of the record on appeal to include these findings is 
not reversible erroro (Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P.) 
Ee The Order of Modification Entered by the Court 
Includes Adequate Findings of Fact to Meet the Requirements 
of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. The scope of Mr. Roberts1 appeal to 
this Court is narrow in its scope. In its most condensed 
form this appeal deals with the application of the Uniform 
Child Support Guidelines by the trial court, and specifically 
the application of §78-45-7.2(4)(5). The trial court in its 
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce of March 10, 1992, 
Paragraph 4, Page 5, (R.150) (Addendum1^11), deals extensively 
with the child support issue. The trial court sets out the 
income of each individual party, indicates that the court is 
applying the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, and sets out 
the child support obligation pursuant to those child support 
guidelines, The scope and breadth of the trial court's Order 
of Modification goes well beyond the normal scope of a 
conclusion of law and/or order. 
It is the position of Mrs. Roberts that the Order of 
Modification entered by the trial court contains the 
essential elements necessary to constitute findings of fact 
as well as the obvious conclusions of law of an order. In 
view of the unexplained absence in the record on appeal of 
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the findings of fact entered by the trial court, this Court 
should find that the requirement to provide findings of fact 
are now met in the Order of Modification, as it contains 
adequate findings of fact to meet the requirement of Rule 
52(a) U.R.C.P. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE. 
A. The Record Reflects a Material Change of 
Circumstances. Mr. and Mrs. Roberts were divorced on March 
5, 1984. The child support was set for the two (2) minor 
children at ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS ($175.00) per 
child for a total monthly child support obligation of THREE 
HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($350.00). The child support remained 
the same for a period of eight (8) years until the Order of 
Modification of March 10, 1992, was entered by the trial 
court changing the child support to TWO HUNDRED TWELVE 
DOLLARS ($212.00) per child for a total support obligation 
for the two (2) teenage children in the amount of FOUR 
HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR DOLLARS ($424.00) per month. The 
difference between support required by the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines applied by the Court and the previous 
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child support obligation was SEVENTY FOUR DOLLARS ($74,00) a 
month or a twenty one percent (21%) difference. The trial 
court set out in its Order of Modification the relative 
salaries of each of the parties and showed the disparity 
between the two, (R.150) (Addendum "D") 
The material circumstances reflected by the record 
consist of the following: ((1) passage of time of eight (8) 
years since an increase in child support has been granted; 
(2) that the two boys were now teenagers? (3) the significant 
disparity between the Plaintiff and the Defendant's income, 
and (4) the application of the Guidelines as to the presumed 
child support payments required, constituted a twenty one 
percent (21%) increase from the original Divorce Decree child 
support payments. 
B. A Material Change of Circumstances is Presumed to 
be Present. In view of the fact that the Plaintiff failed to 
provide a transcript of the trial hearing on January 9, 1992, 
at which time child support payments were argued and ruled 
upon by the trial court, this Court must presume that the 
findings of the court and its ultimate Order of Modification 
are correct inasmuch as there is no record for this Court to 
review. (Please see Mrs. Robert's Argument in Point I, 
Paragraph C , set out above). 
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C« Case Lav Cited in Support of Mr. Roberts1 
Position is Not in Point. Mr. Roberts cites Ostler v. 
Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) as setting out the 
standard of review to determine a material change of 
circumstances. In the case cited above, a material change of 
circumstances was stipulated to by the parties and this Court 
set out criteria for determining the appropriate child 
support amount. However, Ostler v. Ostler, supra, was 
decided March 20, 1990, prior to the effective date of §78-
45-7.2 on April 23, 1990. The implementation of this statute 
as currently amended presumes that the Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines are appropriate unless that presumption is 
rebutted. There is no evidence submitted by Mr. Roberts that 
indicates that the presumption of applying the Uniform Child 
Support Guidelines was rebutted or that the trial court 
established child support after considering the relevant 
factors set out in Ostler v. Ostler, supra, or establishing 
those specific elements needed to rebut the presumptions of 
the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
chose not to include "children not in common to both parties" 
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in the application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, 
inasmuch as the inclusion of such children is optional with 
the court. While the record on appeal does not include 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were entered by 
the trial court, the trial court did (1) make findings, (2) 
ordered counsel to prepare written findings (3) counsel 
submitted written findings to opposing counsel who objected 
to them, (4) entered the findings and made reference to them 
in its Order of Modificationo In view of these facts, and 
that the breadth and scope of the Order of Modification 
included many of the findings of the Court, the requirements 
of Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. have been met and there is no 
reversible error. The record reflects that there was a 
material change of circumstances from the date of the 
original divorce and that child support had never been raised 
or increased during the eight (8) year period, the two 
children were teenagers, and that the Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines set out the disparity between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant's income and called for child support that was 
twenty one percent (21%) greater than the original Divorce 
Decree eight (8) years previous. 
Mrs. Roberts, as the Appellee, requests that the 
Order of Modification of Decree of Divorce granted by the 
trial court be affirmed. 
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DATED this ^ day of March, 1993. 
HOLLIS S. HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
This is to certify that two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief was mailed to 
attorney for Plaintiff/Appellate, Robert W. Hughes, 7050 
Union Park Avenue #420, Midvale, Utah 84047, postage prepaid 
this HL> day of March, 1993 • 
HOLLIS S. HUNT 
Attorney for Appellee/Defendant 
Mary Ann Roberts (Sadler) 
wp5\hsh3\roberts.brf 
28 
1 ' 
fD&SK C. FRATTO, JR. - - -
At torney for P l a i n t i f f 
Met ropol i tan Law Bu i ld ing 
431 South 300 Eas t #101 
S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-1616 
FILED"INT5tER'K,S OFFICE 
Salt Leke County Utah 
MAR 61984 
put} Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARIANNE ROBERTS, 
Defendant, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1 
Civil No. D-83-4535 
The above entitled matter having come on for hearing before 
the Honorable David B. Dee, a Judge of the Third Judicial 
District, on the 1st day of March, 1984; the plaintiff having 
been present and represented by his attorney, JOSEPH C. FRATTO, 
JR., and the defendant not being present or represented by her 
attorney it appearing to the court that the defendant has 
executed Entry of Appearance and Waiver; and the plaintiff having 
testified to matters set forth in his Complaint, and the court 
being fully advised in the premises, and having made and entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty which Decree 
shall become final and absolute upon entry. 
n m *-f 
2. That defendant is awarded the care, custody and con-
trol of the minor children of the parties subject to plaintiff's 
reasonbable and liberal rights of visitation. 
3. That defendant is awarded the sum of One Hundred Seventy 
Five Dollars ($175.00) per month per child for a total of Three 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month as and for child 
support and plaintiff allowed to claim both children for pur-
poses of Federal and State income tax. 
4. That no alimony is awarded either party. 
5o That plaintiff is awarded the sum of Seven Thousand 
Dollars ($7,000.00) from defendant from the sale of property 
at 733 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, payable to plaintiff in the month following 
said sale; and said amount is to be applied to debts and 
obligations as hereinafter required if they have not been pre-
viously discharged by plaintiff and notice sent to defendant 
by plaintiff informing her of their discharge. 
6o That plaintiff is required to maintain medical and 
dental insurance which he receives from Salt Lake County for 
the use and benefit of said minor children; and that all medical 
and dental bills and expenses not covered by said insurance 
should be divided equally between plaintiff and defendant and 
each required to discharge one half (^ ) thereof. 
7. That plaintiff is awarded the 1979 Ford Bronco and 
defendant is awarded the 1981 Ford Mustang automobile. 
8, That all property including furniture, furnishings, 
A A 1 C 
fixtures/ appliances and personal effects is awarded to that 
party in possession and as previously agreed. 
9. That each party is awarded their interest in their 
retirement account and the other party shall take nothing 
thereby. 
10. That plaintiff is required to discharge the following 
debts and obligations and to hold defendant harmless from the 
same. 
a. ZCMI $300.00 
b. Utah State Credit Union $3,500.00 
c. Sears $200.00 
d. VISA $500.00 
e. MasterCharge $900.00 
f. Firestone Tires $50.00 
11. That defendant is required to discharge the obligation 
with Merchandise World of $600.00 and hold plaintiff harmless 
from the same. 
12. That each party is required to pay their own attorneys 
fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
DATED this /£> day of ' ^ ^ A A ^ S ^ ^ , 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
D7WID B. DEE, Judge 
r 
D^Mtv C*erk 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to Marianne 
Roberts, 67 27 South 100 East, Midvale, Utah, 84047. 
This C<? day of '^(AxjuJi , 1984. 
r\ f\ r* r\ 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERTS NICHOLAS JOHN 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
ROBERTS MARY ANN 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 834904535 DA 
DATE 01/09/92 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG 
COURT CLERK AAB 
TYPE OF HEARING: NON JURY TRIAL 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. HUGHES, ROBERT W 
D. ATTY. HUNT, HOLLIS S 
THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR TRIAL ON THE 
MODIFICATION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE, APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. 
AFTER HEARING ARGUMENT FROM BOTH COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS THAT 
THE ABOVE MATTER BE CONTINUED TO JANUARY 21, 1992 AT 11:00 A.M. 
-Vi 
ROBERT W. HUGHES #1573 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
7050 So. Union Park Avenue 
Suite 420 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 566-3688 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY ANN ROBERTS (SALDER), 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW ON PETITION TO 
MODIFY AND ON ORDER 
MODIFYING DECREE OF 
DIVORCE 
Civil No. D83-4535 
Judge Pat Brian 
The Plaintiff, Nicholas John Roberts, by and through 
his counsel of record, hereby objects to the Order Modifying 
Decree of Divorce submitted to this Court by Defendant's counsel 
for the following reasons: 
1. Plaintiff believes that Paragraph 3(c) does not 
accurately represent the ruling of this Court. Plaintiff 
objects to that part of Paragraph 3(c) which provides as 
follows: 
The Defendant shall have the priority in 
the choosing of her three weeks continuous 
summer visitation over that of the 
Plaintiff. Defendant must notify the 
Plaintiff by 5:00 p.m. March 10, 1992 of 
the three weeks period of continuous 
visitation that she selects. 
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Plaintiff has requested a copy of the transcript of the Court's 
ruling to verify that this is a ruling of this Court. 
2. Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 3(d) of the 
proposed Order. Plaintiff objects to this paragraph on the 
grounds that its does not incorporate all of the holidays upon 
which visitation should be alternated between the parties. 
Specifically, the Order does not include Martin Luther King 
(Civil Rights Day). Martin Luther King Day is a holiday listed 
on this Court's schedule of reasonable visitation and should be 
included in the Order. 
3. The Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 3(f) of the 
proposed Order. Paragraph 3(f) provides that the Plaintiff and 
Defendant shall alternate Christmas vacation on Christmas Eve 
and Christmas Day but does not provide that the Defendant should 
also have visitation with the parties' minor child continuing 
through one-half of the child's total Christmas school vacation 
as provided by the schedule of reasonable visitation prepared by 
this Court. 
4. The Plaintiff objects to Paragraph 3(i) of the 
proposed Order. The Court gave no specific ruling with regard 
to grandparent visitation nor was grandparent visitation an 
issue raised by either parties in their initial pleadings. 
Plaintiff objects to the inclusion of grandparent visitation 
| unless such provision provides that neither party shall initiate 
contact with the parent of the other. 
5. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 4 of the proposed 
Order. Plaintiff's objection is based upon the fact that the 
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parties stipulated that child support should be reduced by fifty 
percent (50%) for each child for time periods where the 
Plaintiff has extended visitation with the children for at least 
25 of any 30 consecutive days pursuant to the provisions of 78-
45-7,11 of the Utah Code, 
DATED this ^T^ day of January, 1992. 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Objection to Hollis S. Hunt, Attorney for Defendant, 243 East 
400 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage 
prepaid, this *£/ day of January, 1992. 
£**?£> dL-^'^^i *' (j 
roberobe.obj 
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HOLLIS S. HUNT - #1587 
Attorney for Defendant ' " " 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0099 
FILED DISTRICT C0UIT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 1 0 1992 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY ANN ROBERTS (SADLER), 
Defendant. 
ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No, D83-4535 
Judge Pat Brian 
The Hearing of the Defendant upon her Counterclaim 
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Pat B. 
Brian on January 21, 1992• The Plaintiff was present and 
represented by and through his counsel, Robert W. Hughes. 
The Defendant was present and represented by and through her 
attorney, Hollis S. Hunt. The Court having heard the 
testimony of the parties and respective counsel, reviewed the 
exhibits therein, and after having been fully advised in the 
premises, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE OF MARCH 6, 1984. 
The Divorce Decree of March 6, 1984, between the parties and 
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any subsequent hearings and Orders are hereby modified as set 
out belowe 
2. CHILD CUSTODY. The care, custody and control of 
the minor children: 
NAME DATE OF BIRTH 
Nicholas John Roberts, III November 21, 1978 
Michael Kay Roberts November 22 , 1982 
shall continue to remain with the Defendant, mother, who 
shall have full and sole custody of the minor children, 
subject to reasonable visitation rights of the Plaintiff 
which are more particularly set out below. 
3. VISITATION,, The following shall constitute a 
visitation schedule between the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
for the two (2) minor children referred to above in Paragraph 
1. This visitation schedule shall govern visitation between 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant and shall be considered to be 
the minimal visitation scheduled provided,, The minimum 
visitation schedule for the parties is as follows: 
(a) Weekend Visitation, The Plaintiff shall be 
entitled to visitation with the minor children 
every other weekend from Friday at 7:00 p.m., 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. 
(b) Alternate Weekdays. On the weeks that the 
Plaintiff does not have weekend visitation, the 
Plaintiff shall be entitled to an afternoon with 
the children based upon a twenty-four (24) hour 
notice to the Defendant. The visitation on the 
alternate week-day afternoon shall be from 3:30 
p.m. until 8:00 p.m. that evening. 
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Summer Visitation. The Plaintiff shall be 
entitled to a continuous period of visitation 
during the summer months with the minor children 
for a period of four (4) weeks. Defendant shall 
be entitled to a continuous period of visitation 
with the minor children for a period of three 
(3) weeks. During the continuous period of 
visitation by both the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant none of the weekend visitation, 
alternate weekdays, or holiday visitation shall 
be in force or effect. Such holidays as are 
missed by either the Plaintiff or the Defendant 
shall be moved to the next scheduled holiday for 
which the Summer visitation does not interfere. 
The Defendant shall have priority in the 
choosing of her three (3) weeks continuous 
summer visitation over that of the Plaintiff. 
Defendant must notify the Plaintiff by 5:00 
p.m., March 10, 1992, of the three (3) week 
period of continuous visitation that she 
selects. 
Holidays. Plaintiff and Defendant shall 
alternate standard holiday visitation with the 
minor children of the parties and shall continue 
with the current rotation schedule that is now 
in existence between the parties. Standard 
holidays are as follows: 
New Years Day 
Martin Luther King 
President's Day 
Easter 
Memorial Day 
3 
July 4th 
July 24th 
Labor Day 
(e) Thanksgiving, The parties shall alternate 
Thanksgiving with the one party having the 
children until 2:00 p.m., on Thanksgiving, with 
the other party having the children from 2:00 
p.m. until 8:00 p.m., on Thanksgiving Day, the 
parties alternating every other year. The 
rotation schedule shall remain the same as is 
currently being utilized by the parties. 
(f) Christmas Vacation. The non-custodial parent 
shall have visitation beginning on Christmas Day 
at 1:00 p.m., and continuing through the 
remainder of one half (1/2) of the childrens 
total Christmas School Vacation. 
(g) Mother1s/Fatherfs Day. Each of the respective 
parties shall be entitled to Motherfs Day and 
Father's Day irrespective of the visitation 
schedule of the parties. These two (2) days 
shall take precedence over other visitation and 
the individual parties shall be entitled to have 
visitation with the children on that day from 
8:00 a.m. to 8: p.m. 
(h) Birthdays. The Plaintiff and the Defendant 
shall both have access to the children on the 
birthdays of the respective child to be worked 
out between the Plaintiff and Defendant so not 
as to interfere with the children's celebration 
of their birthday. 
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4. CHILD SUPPORT. The Plaintiff shall each have a 
child support obligation as is set out herein. The Plaintiff 
at the present time is earning a monthly gross salary of 
($2,376.00) per month. The Defendant is earning a gross 
monthly salary of ($1,478.00) per month. Pursuant to the 
Uniform Support Guidelines the Plaintiff is required to pay 
sixty-two percent (62%) of the child support obligation for 
the sum of $212.00 per month for each minor child for a total 
payment of ($424.00) per month. The Defendant is required to 
provide thirty-eight percent (38%) of the child support 
obligation equal to the sum of ($259.00) per month. The 
total child support obligation owed by the Plaintiff to the 
Defendant is the sum of ($424.00) per month. The child 
support shall be paid until each minor child has reached the 
age of eighteen (18) and graduated from high school. 
(a) Non-Payment. In the event of non-payment the 
Plaintiff shall be subject to income withholding 
pursuant to §62A-401, U.C.A. to insure the 
collection of child support stated herein. The 
parties acknowledge that the child support 
obligations as are stated herein are pursuant to 
Child Support Guidelines, and they further 
affirm and swear that the amounts stated herein 
are pursuant to those guidelines, and that the 
income stated herein is supported by pay stubs 
or other information which correctly reflects 
both parties income. 
(b) Extended Visitation. Child support of the non-
custodial parent during periods of extended 
visitation with the non-custodial parent shall 
be reduced pursuant to §78-45-7.11, U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended). 
5 
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5o RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT. The increase in child 
support from ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE DOLLARS ($175.00) per 
child to TWO HUNDRED TWELVE DOLLARS ($212.00) per child, set 
out above in Paragraph 3 shall be retroactive to October 18, 
1990, the date of the filing of the Defendant's counterclaim 
to the Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree. 
The increase in child support from the past ordered child 
support to the currently ordered child support is the sum of 
SEVENTY FOUR DOLLARS ($74.00) per month for sixteen (16) 
months. The sum of the retroactive child support for which 
the Plaintiff is ordered to pay to the Defendant is the sum 
of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY FOUR DOLLARS ($1,184.00), 
which shall be paid at the rate of FIFTY DOLLARS ($50.00) per 
month starting on February 1, 1992, and the first day of the 
month thereafter until paid in full. 
6o INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS. The Defendant shall be 
entitled to claim the income tax deductions for the two (2) 
minor children for both Federal and State Income taxes 
pursuant to the policy of the Uniform Child Support 
Guidelines. The Plaintiff shall not be entitled to claim the 
two (2) minor children as income tax deductions. 
7* ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. Both parties shall be 
required to pay their respective attorney's fees, and costs 
with the Plaintiff paying the costs of the Child Custody 
Evaluation. 
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8. The parties, as provided by Utah Code Ann, §30-3-10.3, 
shall exchange information concerning the health, education, and 
welfare of the children, and, where possible, confer before making 
decisions concerning any of these areas. The Defendant shall 
provide to the Plaintiff notice of the childrens' school, extra-
curricular, and sporting activities, including, but not limited to, 
the dates and times of parent-teacher conferences, copiers of the 
childrens' school report cards, notice of any scouting or other 
extra-curricular activities, and the schedule of sporting 
activities in which the children may participate. 
DATED this / 0 day of March, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
PAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form 
ROBERT W. HUGHE^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ORIGINAL 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS JOHN ROBERTS, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MARY ANN ROEERTS, 
Defendant. 
Case No, S34904535DA 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
HEARING 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
January 21, 1992 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
RHP W»Tfi»S? CPmi 
Thnd Judical District 
JUL 2 2 1992 
SAL1 LAK£ UUUK i 1 
By. 
Deputy Cteffc 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Nicholas John Roberts vs. Mary Ann 
Roberts, D83-4535. Counsel will state an appearance, 
MR. HUGHES: Robert Hughes for Nicholas Roberts, the 
plaintiff. 
MR. HUNT: Hollis Hunt for the defendant. 
THE COURT: You may proceed,, 
MR. HUNT: Your Honor, we are here based upon our 
past appearance before this Court on January 9, 1992. The 
Court — there are five issues. The Court gave its thinking 
on these issues, and then sent counsel out to see if we could 
resolve them. Let me review those issues for you. 
The Court indicated to us that -- let me back up, so 
that you won't have to reread the file. This matter was 
brought by the plaintiff on a petition to modify. The 
defendant filed a counterclaim for increased child support, 
some attorney's fees and some visitation rights. The child --
the change of custody has been resolved in favor of the 
defendant mother, with whom the children have been residing 
the entire time since their divorce. That no longer remains 
an issue. What does remain an issue is the counterclaim 
raised by the defendant, asking for an increase of child 
support. The Court ruled last on January 9, 1992, that the 
child support should be $212 per month, per child, for a total 
of $424 for two teenage boys. 
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1 The question then became, that we could not resolve 
2 between counsel, is whether or not, under the guidelines, that 
3 the income tax deductions which had previously been claimed by 
4 the plaintiff should now revert to the mother defendant, based 
5 upon the fact that the guidelines are calculated based upon 
6 the fact that the guidelines utilize the custodial parent 
7 having the income tax deductions. And it was based upon that 
8 premise that the child support was calculated pursuant to the 
9 guidelines, and, of course, the defendants posture. 
10 Plaintiff refused to go along that line, wanting to split 
11 those between the parties. But we did not believe that was 
12 the intent of the Court, nor, certainly, not the guidelines. 
13 The other thing we would ask for was three 
14 continuous weeks for the mother during the summertime. I am 
15 not sure whether counsel for the plaintiff acknowledges that, 
16 or not. Ke was going to talk to his client. We are just 
17 asking for three continuous weeks. He has six. We want 
18 that -- excuse me, he has four weeks, and we have three. Ke 
19 insists that his four weeks visitation be continuous, without 
20 any interruption. All we have asked for is three, and we have 
21 a priority to determine when those three weeks are. I am not 
!2 I sure how serious an issue that is. I couldn^t get an 
agreement on that. Mr. Hughes and I talked. 
24 | We also asked, on behalf of the defendant, for some 
attorney's fees. The Court was not heavily inclined to grant 
those when we met on the 9th. I am concerned. Let me tell 
you my concern. It is that the defendant has been brought 
into this court on November 28, 1990, on an order to show 
cause, was previously brought in this court by the plaintiff 
on January 2, 1991, again on March 13, 1991, October 17, 1991, 
January 9, 1992, and again we are here on January 21, 1992. 
She has $2,085 in attorney's fees. We believe that the 
matter — the Court has given ample opportunity for the 
parties to resolve the issue. They just simply cannot. We 
would hope that the Court would make a definitive order today. 
We clearly believe that we ought to have that done, and be 
done with it today. 
The only thing I would add to the Court is there was 
some concern on the part of the plaintiff, because of a second 
marriage and another child, and they want an offset for a 
second child. And the Court, I think, handled that matter on 
the 9th, under 78-45-7.2, paragraph (4)(a), where it says that 
they may be able to take that deduction. In view of the fact 
that the defendant makes such a small amount of income, and 
that she has two boys, the Court concluded that the child 
support would be $212 per child, for a total of $424. We 
would like a definitive ruling at this point, if we may. 
THE COURT: Response? 
MR. HUGHES: Brief response. These are the five 
issues that are before the Court today. I agree with 
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1 Mr. Hunt. 
2 THE COURT: What five issues arc before the Court? 
3 MR. HUGHES: The child support, the income tax 
4 deductions, the three weeks -- continuous weeks of vacation, 
5 and the attorney's fees. You said five. Those were the four 
6 that I wrote down. 
7 MR. HUNT: The child support, you have already ruled 
8 on. There really are just -- the arrearage is the other 
9 issuec That is that defendant raised this issue on child 
10 support on October 18, 1990, and that 16 months have 
11 transpired. There is a difference in child support of $350 a 
12 month to the current child support of $424 a month, thatfs $74 
13 difference, if you times that by 16, if my calculation is 
14 correct, it is $1,184. The Court indicated last on the 9th 
15 that it was inclined to require the plaintiff to pay that 
16 arrearage at $50 a month, or some nominal fee. We have no 
17 problem with that. But we have asked for and believe under 
18 the statute that we are entitled to the arrearage, as we 
19 raised this issue back in October of 1990. That's the other 
20 issue, 
21 MR. HUGHES: Those would be the five, your Honor. 
22 If I may address each of those, I guess almost reverse order. 
23 Counsel and I have talked about this. We have tried 
24 diligently to work many of these matters out. While we are 
25 close, it has just been to the point where we haven!t been 
able to come to a final conclusion. 
Counsel has started out by citing for the Court, and 
did so in the last hearing -- unfortunately, I was without a 
statute, my statute book, on the last hearing — let me read 
that, if I may, in its entirety. "The natural or adoptive 
children of either parent who live in the home of that parent 
and are not children in common to both parties may at the 
option of either party be taken into account under the 
guidelines." This is not an option of the Court. It is not 
an option of us to agree on. It is an option of either party. 
As the Court will remember we did support a 
memorandum, and in our memorandum we did indicate in that that 
we had elected to include the work sheet indicating the 
present children in Mr. Roberts1 home. We believe that was 
important for a couple of reasons. The Court was -- the Court 
pointed out, and applauded my client for paying $350 since 
1984, but, as the Court pointed out $75, approximately, 
increase in 1984 is not that much. It is a relative thing. 
My client is a sheriff deputy. The Court is aware of his 
income„ 
As the Court pointed out, the two children that we 
are talking about today are older. One is, in fact, a 
teenager. The Court pointed out it is very expensive to raise 
a teenager. All my client would like to point out on that 
area, it is an election he could make, it is an election he 
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1 made, it is an election we have used to fill out the child 
2 support work sheets, indicating he should pay $350 a month. I 
3 think that's important. And the purpose for that is there are 
4 costs associated in raising a new child, especially, as the 
5 Court pointed out, teenage children are very expensive to 
6 raise, but an infant is also very expensive. 
7 In this case both my client and his new wife work, 
8 Since they are both employed, they require day care. That 
9 child, as an infant, requires constant care. That's very 
10 expensive. That's our insistence in making that election on 
11 the child support work sheets. 
12 Next, with regard to the income tax deductions, I 
13 have argued this. I will be very brief. My client, as 
14 pointed out, has been paying $350 since, I think, 1984, 
15 probably higher than was required in 1984, and I think part of 
16 that election was because he had, in fact, agreed to pay a 
17 fairly high amount of child support for 1984 standards0 
18 Suddenly now, it is about evened out, and they want to take 
19 that away from him, even though he has had a long history of 
20 paying that amount. There has never been an issue before the 
21 Court where he has been delinquent. It is a matter of that's 
22 what happened. That's what they agreed on. We acknowledged 
23 that the child support guidelines now provide that the 
24 custodial parent take them. This is a little different type 
25 of story, a little different fact situation. We have 
suggested, at the very least, if they are going to be taken 
from my client, that that tax deduction be split. 
Mr. Hunt has indicated that we have considered three 
continuous weeks of visitation. We have no problem with that. 
We have agreed to it in principle. The problem I have had, 
and I have explained it to Mr. Hunt, is all we have asked is 
either -- because she is the custodial parent, she has the 
children that are there or in her custody all the time, that 
either we make up the weekend that we miss, or add another 
week, or some other arrangement. 
Our reason for that is -- and I will try to give a 
brief example — for instance, if his visitation was on the 
first weekend of a month, the second weekend he would have no 
visitation, the third or the seventh, the fourteenth, if she 
elected, he would not have visitation, the next week he would 
not, the next week he would not, and the natural rotation of 
things, he would not have visitation the next week, weekend 
visitation, to be accurate, and he would have visitation the 
next week. That would mean my client would go between 
visitations five or six weeks without visitation. We simply 
said that should be made up. 
What we have are two good parents. My client has an 
interest of having a good relationship with his children. 
Mr. Hunt has pointed out to me there is during the week 
visitation, so it really wouldn't be that long. All we have 
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been asking is that during that three-week period she can take 
them, do whatever she wants, but let us make it up somehow. 
Mr. Hunt has brought up the issue of giving 
preference. We have agreed, again in principle, to give them 
the preference to decide what three weeks she wants. However, 
we have asked that, in making that election, that she make the 
election by January 15. The reason for that is my clientfs 
new wife has to bid her vacations, and her bids are due during 
that time. So, for her to make a bid, so they can make a bid 
for her visitation, and so they can arrange it, they need to 
know approximately that time, at least have that much notice. 
If she can elect by that, we have no problem with it. 
The attorney's fees, we have argued this, your 
Honor. I have been here each of those times. We have tried 
to act reasonably. Mr. Hunt pointed out there was an order to 
show cause. The Court is aware of the report by Dr. Landau, 
of why we felt that it was important for us to come into court 
immediately. We have tried to be fair in this. In fact, when 
the Court said have a visit, a child custody evaluation done, 
we did it. My client paid for all of that. The evaluation 
came back. My client had comfort or peace of mind that 
everything was, in fact, all right. And we dropped that. So 
the issue since that time has been trying to determine the 
amount of child support. 
The last issue would concern the amount of making 
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the — if the Court orders that the child support should 
increase, which we do not concede would be appropriate, under 
the reading of 78-45-7.2(4), which I indicated to the Court, 
that that should not be retroactive. My client has been a 
good parent. Ke has tried to take care of his children. If 
the Court does order it, he will, of course, start making that 
child support as ordered by the Court. But it would not be 
fair, under the circumstances of this case, considering the 
income of my client, to suddenly make him start paying for 
back child support, when he, as the Court indicated in our 
last hearing, has been very fair and good about paying his 
child support. 
MR. HUNT: Just a couple of comments, so there is 
not a misconception about what the statute says. If we read 
78-45-7.2(5), which follows (4), which has been read to the 
Court, it says, "In a proceeding to modify an existing award, 
consideration of natural or adoptive children, other than 
those common to both parties, may again be applied to mitigate 
an increase in an award.11 That's talking about the Court. It 
is true that either party may elect to try to put that into 
the calculation of the support amount. But the Court still 
has that election whether to accept it, or not. 
The other concern that I have is that, somehow, the 
plaintiff and Mr. Hughes haven't acknowledged the visitation. 
All we are asking for is three weeks, so that the defendant 
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1 can take the children on a vacation. In the past, the 
2 plaintiff has insisted that his period of visitation during 
3 the summer have absolutely no interruption. We havenf t argued 
4 about that. We just want reciprocity, so that the defendant 
5 can go on a vacation. The plaintiff, at the present time, has 
6 alternate weekend visitation, and on the weekend that he does 
7 not have visitation, he has mid-week visitation. There has 
8 been not a problem with that. 
9 Somehow — and I haven't understood their 
10 calculation or their theory -- they believe that if the 
11 defendant were to have the children continuously for three 
12 weeks, they would go some extended, five-week period of time 
13 without visitation. It is impossible for me to understand how 
14 that happens, because they have visitation each and every 
15 week, It just so happens that one week it is weekend, and the 
16 next week it is mid week. And there is just simply not a 
17 denial of visitation. I don't see how the plaintiff -- excuse 
18 me, the defendant would have to make up that time. It 
19 certainly hasnft been the position of the plaintiff to allow 
20 her to make up that kind of time. Somehow, the rationale 
21 there, I think they are missing part of that visitation 
22 schedule that we have put out, 
23 The other thing is that my client has asked for that 
24 election of that three-week period, contrary to the 
25 plaintiff's new wife, the party to this action, the defendant, 
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is not able even to select her visitation -- excuse me, her 
vacation period at the Department of Corporations until March. 
So it is just impossible for her to make an election in 
January. She has no problem complying with the January date 
out of principle. But that her department is run by the 
State, and the State simply does not allow her to make an 
election. We will stipulate that she will make the earliest 
possible election of her vacation time, that her employer 
allows. I don't want to penalize the plaintiff at all. She 
just simply doesnft have any control over the personnel policy 
of the Department of Corporations. Again, she thinks that the 
earliest she can even make an election is March of each year. 
If the policy at the Department of Corporations changes, she 
will so notify the plaintiff, and make that election as soon 
as her employer will allow her to do so. 
Again, on the attorney's fees issue, we just believe 
this thing has gone on and on. We have handled the laboring 
oar. I have put out three different modifications -- proposed 
orders and stipulations for the parties. We just can't simply 
get the plaintiff to concede on this. Ke continues to press 
the issue on deductions. And it is clear that if we go by the 
guidelines, the guidelines intricately are calculated upon 
income tax deduction going to the custodial parent. At $453 a 
month, to raise two boys on $424 a month child support, she 
simply has to have the deductions. That is a matter of 
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settled law, I don't even think it is arguable. We believe 
that that has been resolved long ago. And the Court should 
follow the settled law in this jurisdiction, based upon those 
guidelines. In other words, if the guidelines govern one 
other aspect of the child support calculation, it ought to 
govern the other aspect of it, as well, or otherwise it 
doesn't have any efficacy. 
We would submit it. 
MR. HUGHES: May I bring up one other quick issue 
that I forgot to raise? That, simply, deals with -- I don't 
know it is a problem -- 78-45-7.11, reduction of child support 
during the period that my client has extended visitation with 
the children, since that's a part of the statute, part of the 
guidelines, it is not a part of this decree, we would ask any 
order the Court would make would include that prescription by 
the statute, 
MR, HUNT: As long as it applies evenly across the 
board, we will follow the guidelines, I don't want to have — 
be stuck with the guidelines on one part of it, and then 
ignore the income tax deduction on the other, Obviously, we 
will follow it. 
THE COURT: Both sides submit? 
MR. HUGHES: Yes, your Honor, 
THE COURT: The Court has met repeatedly with both 
parties and counsel. The Court has heard extensive argument 
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on the issues now before the Court. The Court is informed and 
rules as follows: Regarding the change of custody, that 
matter has been resolved previously, and will be reflected in 
the findings, conclusions and the order of modification that 
custody remains with the defendant. 
Regarding child support, the Court finds that, 
pursuant to the uniform child support guidelines, child 
support is to be calculated at $212 per child per month. That 
is the order of the Court. 
The counterclaim in this matter was filed in October 
of 1990, increasing child support. The increased child 
support will relate back to the date of the counterclaim. The 
arrearages, unless they are disputed, in the amount of $1,184, 
will be paid by plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of 
$50 per month, the first payment is due February 1, 1992, and 
$50 on the first day of each month thereafter, until the 
arrearages in the amount of $1,184 have been paid in their 
entirety. 
By statute, the tax deductions belong to the 
defendant. The Court so orders. The defendant, being the 
custodial parent. 
Regarding summer visitation, the plaintiff will have 
four weeks of uninterrupted visitation to use as he 
chooses. The parties have stipulated that for that period of 
time child support will be modified, accordingly, pursuant to 
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statute, ana that is the order of the Court. The defendant 
will have three weeks of uninterrupted summer vacation with 
the children. The defendant will notify the plaintiff on or 
before 5:00 p.m. March 10, 1992, of the three weeks which will 
be exercised for uninterrupted visitation by the defendant. 
The Court has expressed its displeasure, on prior 
occasions, with the parties1 inability to resolve what appear 
to be very noncontroversial, nondisputed issues. The failure 
of the parties to do so has resulted in the incuring of very, 
very substantial legal fees and court costs in this matter. 
It is unfortunate that the fees have been incurred. The Court 
is not prepared to rule that one party is more at fault than 
the other party in their combined inability to resolve these 
issues. Attorney*s fees will be borne by each party. 
Counsel for the defendant will prepare findings of 
fact, conclusions of lav; and a modified order, all reflecting 
the stipulations of the parties and the rulings and findings 
and conclusions of the Court. Those documents will be 
submitted for signature on or before January 28, 1992, at 
5:00 p.m., for signing and filing with the clerk of the court. 
(This proceeding was concluded.) 
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